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Editorial
BETTINA GRANSOW
The restructuring of Chinese cities has produced new spatial forms suchas glittering and globally-oriented Central Business Districts, iconicarchitecture, forests of skyscrapers, development zones, shopping
malls, suburban villas, university cities, and cultural clusters. Many Chinese
cities have launched comprehensive entrepreneurial strategies to boost their
role in intense intercity competition. While promoting entrepreneurial dis-
courses, cities are also presenting themselves not only as economic and
metropolitan centres but also as “world-class cities”; they have recently
begun to discover their local cultural heritage as an asset in pursuing this
strategy. Images of “world-class” cities were promoted in particular during
special events such as the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, the World
Expo in Shanghai, and the Asian Games in Guangzhou in 2010. According
to Ananya Roy, such strategies of “worlding” the cities of the Global South,
or more broadly, the twenty-first-century metropolises, go beyond concep-
tualisations of Third World Urbanism that place the mega-city and its slums
at the centre of the creation of urban futures. (1)
Critical reflections on the production of contemporary urban space in the
Global South centre around neoliberalism and right to the city (chengshi-
quan 城市权). Originating from Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s, the slogan
“right to the city” stands for creating rights by means of political and social
action. Lefebvre articulated a demand for redistribution and recognition, a
claim challenging the rich and powerful, and a claim founded on fundamen-
tal principles of justice and ethics as opposed to a legal claim enforceable
via judicial processes. (2) The slogan was taken up again worldwide during
the global financial crisis in 2009 and has been interpreted by various NGOs,
advocacy groups, and international organisations in different ways. As it was
scaled up from more revolutionary interpretations by grass-roots organisa-
tions to global political arenas and institutions, a process of depoliticisation
could be observed. Today the interpretations of “right to the city” extend
from its original revolutionary and transformative understanding to more
watered-down definitions as legal rights for specific vulnerable groups. Un-
like Lefebvre’s concept, such institutionalised sets of rights boil down to
claims for inclusion into existing systems with an eye to good urban gov-
ernance, including toolkits for participatory decision-making and trans-
parency on local levels, but without aiming at a transformation of existing
systems. (3)
Three general trends of the city in the Global South have been identified: (4)
increasing social polarisation and spatial division within the city; the refash-
ioning of certain urban quarters of the divided city into cosmopolitan land-
scapes and the integration of unevenly developed spaces into an unstable
and conflict-prone “whole”; and competing claims and oppositional forms
of governance that “give rise to distinctive political struggles seeking to
exert influence across city spaces and to remake, defend, or control those
spaces.” (5) Far from exhibiting a process of convergence, these struggles take
various forms and are producing new spatial configurations in different na-
tional, transnational, and local settings. This observation fits in well with the
“right to the city” discourse.
Regarding China, while there is broad debate about urbanisation and urban
issues (such as the hukou system, land-use rights and land markets, urban
villages and the marginalisation of migrants in the city, redevelopment and
displacement of residents, nail houses, and collective action), a more explicit
discourse on “right to the city” is still in its early stages. One argument is
that the right to the Chinese city has become part of the broader project of
entrepreneurial city building and emphasises eligibility in form of "entry"
qualifications rather than granting migrants in the city the same entitle-
ments that permanent urban hukou holders can enjoy. (6) Others assert the
right to urban life as inextricable from a social project of altering dominant
power structures. They suggest that the rights of three social groups, namely
socialist workers in work units, rural migrants, and urban redevelopment
displacees, to the modern Chinese city is situated within the uneven distri-
bution of social power and corresponding infrastructures of social control,
which contribute to these social groups’ structural marginality in the process
of urban social formation. (7) A critical revisiting of existing debates on prop-
erty rights activism refers to the “right to the city” perspective to examine
whose rights count in China’s urban development and proposes a cross-
class alliance engaging both migrants and local citizens. Such an alliance, it
has been argued, has the potential to overcome the limited level of rights
awareness that rests primarily on distributive justice in China. (8) This view
is contested by the findings of some of the contributions to this special fea-
ture, suggesting that different social actors may distance themselves from
each other in the context of collective action.
The process of reconfiguration of Chinese cities, which is embedded in
while at the same time shaping broader currents of urbanisation in the de-
veloping world, includes not only a physical restructuring of urban spaces
but also a challenge to established configurations of land ownership and
control, space-based consumption, and entitlements on the part of urban
citizens. Thus Chinese cities, and the spaces that constitute them, have be-
come arenas of heightened contestation, from both within and without the
city itself. But who exactly is involved in negotiating/contesting the organ-
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isation of new urban spaces in China, and how? How do various urban actors
imagine the Chinese city of the future, and what are their strategies for cre-
ating their own urban spaces? What are the perspectives of rapid urbanisa-
tion in China – can a broad middle class emerge in the near future as
imagined within the concept of the harmonious society? Or will the rural-
urban divide give rise to increasingly polarised urban societies? How does
agency by rural migrants impact urban spaces? 
This special feature will not be able to shed light on all of the many ques-
tions arising from the contestation of urban spaces. For example, it con-
tains no papers on spaces of production and workers’ strike actions, on
gender specific dimensions of urban contestation or – 25 years after the
crackdown on the Tiananmen protest movement and in light of political
demonstrations on Tahrir, Taksim, and Maidan – the iconic role of public
squares. What is presented here is first-hand research on three different
dimensions of contestation and the urban spaces thereby formed, includ-
ing: 1) contestation from within the city, focussing on permanent urban
citizens turned homeowners, on homeowner activism and on urban neigh-
bourhoods under the threat of urban redevelopment; 2) contestation from
the margins of urban society, focussing on an influx of rural migrants, the
relation of urban villages and the city, and negotiations over public spaces
between beggars and security personnel; and 3) contestation at the fringes
of the city focussing on the placement of infrastructure facilities and en-
vironmental activism, and on the decay and reimagination of rural village
communities under urbanisation.  
Contestation from within the city 
China’s rapid urbanisation is a process whereby urban space is increas-
ingly privatised. More than three quarters of urban households in China
currently own their own living space. Beijing now has 700-800 residen-
tial communities with formally organised homeowners’ associations. (9)
Symbols of urban modernity and social status, the new “gated commu-
nities” that have developed since the 1990s may yet become the centre
of conflict between different categories of actors: homeowners’ com-
mittees defending their rights, real estate developers and management
companies, residents’ committees and local administrations. Focussing
on a collective initiative in Beijing aiming at establishing a municipal
federation of homeowners’ committees and creating a nation-wide net-
work, Aurore Merle examines the ability of homeowners’ movements
to go beyond the gates of local communities and federate their various
claims. She reaches the conclusion that the application committee re-
questing authorisation for a federation of homeowners’ committees in
Beijing (yeshenwei 业申委) limits the scope for intervention by the
party/state on the local level and can thus help strengthen civil society.
However, given the complex interconnections between homeowners’
organisations and administrative organs as well as market forces, one
might also come to the conclusion, as did Shen Yuan, that “the prop-
erty-owning class is producing its own civil society.” (10) While discourse
on the existence and scope of action of an emerging civil society in
China has thus far concentrated almost exclusively on the balance of
power between it and the state, on lines of conflict, or on overlaps and
interdependencies with the state and its many levels, Merle’s paper
raises the additional question of civil society and fragmentation. The
homeowners’ movement powered by the new urban middle class is not
only gaining autonomy vis-à-vis state bodies but is also pursuing de-
cidedly individual interests. As such, it does not stand pars pro toto for
“society” as such, but rather is contributing to the process of segrega-
tion in urban spaces and the compartmentalisation of Chinese civil so-
ciety. 
The introduction of commodified land, housing markets, and commercial
projects often leads to large-scale demolition of housing and displacement
of urban populations. Particularly in neighbourhoods with historical flair and
culturally significant architecture, personal and collective memories are
closely interconnected with the history of the place. Bettina Gransow ex-
amines the social impact of an ongoing redevelopment project and how
citizens’ activism unfolds in reaction to the impact on their everyday lives
and community in an old town neighbourhood of Guangzhou. Her study is
structured by a recognition-theoretical model of social conflicts (following
on Nancy Fraser and her debate with Axel Honneth over redistribution
and/or recognition). (11) Gransow focuses on contestation in economic (fair
compensation), social (rupture of family and residential networks), cultural
(authenticity of the place), and political (public participation) dimensions
of recognition. While scholarly discussion of collective action and protest
movements concentrates on the forms and extent of protest and its ability
to challenge the party-state, the perspective afforded by conflicts of recog-
nition sheds new light on the underlying motives and driving forces behind
citizens’ action. The example of a socially mixed neighbourhood impacted
by a redevelopment project clearly shows not only the mechanism behind
gentrification and social segregation but also the asymmetrical power re-
lations among affected citizens trying to resist this process. Temporary al-
liances with supporting groups, media, and academia are helping to
empower citizen activists and to design fresh and innovative conceptions
of the neighbourhood as a historical place, its meaning for the local people
personally, its public significance, and its potential for renewal based on the
ideas of local people, but at the end of the day only very few residents may
enjoy the outcomes of this endeavour.
Contestation at the margins of urban
society
The movement of hundreds of millions of rural migrants during China’s
market reform has produced thousands of migrant enclaves in Chinese cities
that – compared with massive city slums in which migrants find cheap shel-
ter in other developing countries – are disproportionately fewer, more spo-
radic, and less visible in the urban landscape. Examining the pattern of
migrant settlements in Shenzhen, Edmund Cheng explains how urban vil-
lages and factory dormitories have become the major forms of migrant set-
tlements when migrants are viewed as a temporary workforce without
rights to the city. He then analyses how and why the spatial contention
brought by rural migrants is shaped and kept latent by the dynamics of
urban planning in Shenzhen as the forerunner of other Chinese cities. While
all over China there are many different forms of urban villages depending
on specific circumstances and local policies, a common threat to urban vil-
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lages is the aggressive redevelopment policy of municipal governments. Not
only the provision of migrant housing is at stake but also urban village
economies, which particularly in inner city districts may have close links
with the surrounding urban economy. (12)
The majority of rural-to-urban migrants are workers and small business-
people. But there are also migrants who are unable to work for various rea-
sons, some of whom make a living from panhandling in public urban spaces.
While defined by its relative accessibility to all members of a society, public
space is not a space free of power structures or their challenges. Beggars –
highly marginalised in Chinese society – depend for their very existence on
the appropriation of urban public space. At the same time, local govern-
ments often deny them the needed visibility by using a regime of public
order consisting of security personnel, related policies, and discourses. The
paper by Ryanne Flock focuses on the dynamics of contestation over public
space by beggars facing this official regime and asks: Who are the actors
using which concrete mechanisms and reasons to refuse or allow beggars
access to public space? How do beggars appropriate and maximise their
chances of appropriating public space? Flock’s paper takes the metropolis
of the south, Guangzhou, as a case study and concentrates on the most dy-
namic places for panhandling: the environs of temples and churches as well
as popular shopping streets. She finds that beggars in public space face con-
trasting sources of governmental legitimacy – economic progress and
strength on the one hand, which their presence undermines, versus respon-
sibility and morality on the other, which should be applied to assist them –
leading to a double-bind logic of control and tolerance. This finding coin-
cides with Vivienne Shue’s insight into the contested discourse on charity
in China. Looking into the potential for mutual empowerment by the state
and society, she found that local governors responsible for civil affairs still
see charity as the responsibility of the state and not of society, because
their legitimacy depends on being perceived as “benevolent” (ren 仁) state
officials. (13)
Contestation at the outskirts of the city
Rapid urbanisation requires infrastructure such as sewage plants and waste-
to-energy (WTE) incinerators, which are usually built on the outskirts of
cities. Homeowners who find comparatively low-priced living space or in-
vestment property in these areas use various means to resist the construction
of such facilities. Many parts of China have seen protests against waste in-
cineration plants. The article by Amy Zhang examines the logic and framing
of homeowner protests against WTE incineration in Guangzhou. She argues
that the concept of rational (lixing 理性) resistance emphasised by home-
owner activists represents one way of understanding urban environmental
contention in China. Urban homeowners use rational resistance to distinguish
themselves from both villagers and the state. According to Zhang, their focus
on rationality is a critique of the government’s reliance on technology to re-
solve the social problem of waste management. By introducing the concept
of “rational resistance,” Zhang builds on the discourse of “rightful resistance”
initiated by Kevin O’Brien, but sees the demands of urban environmental
protesters as going beyond the arguments of village protesters and thereby
highlights a phenomenon that has thus far not received sufficient attention
in the literature on collective actions, namely the distancing of middle-class
actors from other social groups in environmental protests.
The urbanisation of villages on the outskirts of cities is often accompanied
by disputes over rural land. This in turn is associated with social upheaval
and reconfigurations of economic structures and cultural traditions. Iam-
chong Ip focuses on the conscious struggles of social actors to strengthen
and form their own territorialities, simultaneously resisting, negotiating
with, and conforming to state-led urbanisation. Using the example of Dong-
guan, he argues that the dynamic between class restructuring, communal
imaginations, and a cellular form of activism is an integral part of state-led
urbanisation in Guangdong. This process is not simply a conflict of interest
between the local state and the population, but also a struggle against pro-
letarianisation in a fast-growing capitalist and industrial environment.
Only occasionally do the case studies in this special feature refer explicitly
to the “right to the city” discourse, although they definitely have the po-
tential to make a contribution here and advance the discussion. These case
studies based on careful field work allow new configurations of China’s
urban society to be traced, which can help to understand more recent issues
at the nexus of the state, market forces, and (civil) society that transcend
the results of individual studies. Such issues include the generalisation of
gentrification plus the mechanisms behind the rise of a new type of urban
poverty accompanying marginalisation, alienation, and a loss of identity
(see the papers by Edmund Cheng, Bettina Gransow, and Iam-chong Ip in
this volume), as well as the tendency toward fragmentation on the part of
civil society within the process of collective action (see Amy Zhang, Iam-
chong Ip, and Aurore Merle).
The segregation of social space and
gentrification as a mainstream phenomenon.
Widespread modernisation and large-scale urban infrastructure projects
trigger processes of gentrification that lead to the destruction of inner-city
neighbourhood communities. These processes are linked to residential seg-
regation, marginalisation, loss of social networks, and isolation of the poor
and elderly. Whilst urban poverty in China in the 1990s could still be as-
cribed in large part to the loss of employment and was also considered cush-
ioned by the existence of the danwei system, large-scale modernisation
projects have paved the way for gentrification as a mainstream phenome-
non in Chinese urban development. In Guangdong province the “Three Olds”
(sanjiu 三旧) policy (2009) is already accelerating the redevelopment of
inner-city “old” urban villages, industrial areas, and residential districts. On
a national scale a similar policy is being established for the coming years
as part of the National New-Type Urbanisation Plan (2014-2020) (国家新
型城镇化规划 2014-2020 年) released on 16 March 2014. (14) At least three
types of local communities will be destroyed under the maxim of economic
growth: inner-city neighbourhoods, urban villages, and village communities
near cities. Spatial interventions promoted jointly by local state and market
forces are triggering protests, collective and individual actions that contain
both defensive and proactive elements: neighbourhood preservation as well
as territorial and cultural/historical re-imagination of the contested spaces.
Against an overpowering alliance of local government (including its urban
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planners), developers, and real estate companies, there is very little room
for sustainable urban development strategies in social and environmental
terms. A civil society kept artificially weak cannot function as a corrective
– either via strong intermediary organisations or via legally anchored par-
ticipatory rights – to urban development policies that can easily be expected
to induce further social upheaval.
Fragmentation of civil society – How
collective is collective action?
The papers in this special feature address in different ways how social
actors distance themselves from each other: urban homeowners from vil-
lagers and villagers from migrants form two dominant patterns in the so-
cial transformation of Chinese society. Of special interest for our area of
study is the self-distancing that takes place in the context of collective
actions. In addition to the farmers who lose their land and the migrant
workers who cannot live in cities on their wages, the actors of urban con-
testation include above all the new middle classes, with a focus on col-
lective action by homeowners. Noteworthy here is the question of
whether they are pursuing primarily private interests either as individuals
or as a social group, and in so doing whether they are helping or hindering
the strengthening of civil society. In particular, Zhang’s paper on “rational
resistance” illustrates how homeowners protesting a WTE incinerator near
their neighbourhood at the edge of the city deliberately distance them-
selves from what they see as an emotional and inarticulate protest on the
part of local villagers. They present themselves as “citizen experts” on
equal standing with government representatives, who not only compre-
hend the technical (and social) implications of the new urban infrastruc-
ture better than the latter but are also able to gain from distinguishing
themselves from the villagers in the sense described by Pierre Bourdieu. (15)
The middle-class protesters thus gain in social identity and strengthen
their own position, which also means a strengthening of the protest
movement. At the same time, however, they contribute to the fragmen-
tation of collective action and thus weaken the protest’s effectiveness. It
is therefore not only state control and intervention that limit the expan-
sion and strengthening of civil society but also a (quasi-inevitable) frag-
mentation within this society’s own ranks. This dual weakening of civil
society means that its production of precisely those intermediary struc-
tures and urban spaces needed to achieve social sustainability can proceed
at only a very slow and laborious pace.
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